

EYES ONLY

DD/A Registry

Approved For Release 2002/07/12 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000700060006-7

CONFIDENTIAL

File Security-5

ER 77-7777/1

DDA 77-3433

1 JUL 1977


MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Administration

FROM: Robert W. Gambino
Director of Security

SUBJECT: Security Reinvestigation Program (U)

1. (U) Action Requested: None; for information only.
2. (U/AIUO) Background: Reference is made to your memorandum of 1 June 1977 which relates to the Office of Security Reinvestigation Program of 1976, when we processed 762 reinvestigation cases and developed noteworthy information in 72 cases. A question was raised as to what action was ultimately taken in those 72 reinvestigation cases.
3. (C) A current review of our security files on these Agency employees reflects the following breakdown of the 72 cases, which have been summarized in the attachments:




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
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4. (U/AIUO) It is to be noted that the current review of these files was somewhat detailed and the summaries accurately reflect the nature of the basic problem, as well as the final disposition of the cases. There is obviously some risk in categorizing the cases in absolute terms because the difficulties sometimes overlap, as in the areas of marital, alcohol, financial, and personality problems. One case might have all these ingredients.

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a. It must be recognized that there is an extremely close interrelationship between security and suitability issues.

b. First-line supervisors are in the best position to know about developing problem situations, and they must accept action responsibility in alerting appropriate Agency elements when there are security implications in the case.

c. A vigorous repolygraph program offers the best chance of uncovering an individual who is deliberately violating the security trust placed in him by the Agency.

d. A more forceful hand needs to be taken in weeding out officers whose long-term track record clearly indicates that they are unsuited for Agency employment.

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9. (C) The key point is that the Office of Security must rely to a considerable extent on the cooperation and support of Agency officers, who must assist us in this endeavor. If

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Security presses unreasonably hard in a unilateral approach, it will smack of "Big Brother is watching" and the entire effort could prove to be counterproductive. Within the Agency we have always prided ourselves on the fact that security is a positive ongoing program which provides an overall environment conducive to helping our employees in problem situations.

10. (C) A key function of the Office of Security is its role in assisting those employees who get into trouble. Upon occasion there will be individuals who have difficulties with local law enforcement bodies or have personal problems of one kind or another. A Security Duty Office staffed 24 hours a day and a staff of Security Officers ready to respond at any time fulfill this role in affording an immediate response capability for staff employees who need assistance. The whole program is designed not necessarily to punish an employee, but to establish a spirit of mutual trust and acceptance wherein an employee knows that he or she can come to the Office of Security and receive a helping hand and a sympathetic ear.

11. (U/AIUO) In substance, I feel that we do have a good ongoing personnel security program. There may be some fine tuning to improve the procedures, but the basic security policies strike me as being fundamentally sound.

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for Robert W. Gambino

Atts

Distribution

Original - Addressee

1 - DDCI

1 - ER

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C

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Executive Registry

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

22 June 1977

DDA Registry

77-3624

NOTE FOR: DDA

SUBJECT: DCI's Inquiry Concerning
Security Reinvestigations

Jack:

As reflected in his attached comment,
the DDCI feels we need to do a better job
in responding to the Director's inquiry.
I suggest the following:

a. that we explain the specifics
of each case, perhaps in an attachment,
and work some examples into the paras
of the covering memo; such as (1) names,
(2) nature of the case (security violations,
excessive debt, misconduct, etc.), (3) rea-
son for disposition or action taken.

b. an assessment of our current
system of identifying potential security
cases and any recommendations for
improvement.

Assistant to the Deputy Director

Attachment:

ER 77-7777/1

*Re a (1) - We will
not include names, key
to SS file numbers.
Re b. Try to tie in
with sec for personnel and
informants named in the
Victor Book.*

DDA REGISTRY BACKGROUND

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DDA Registry
File *Security 5*

DDA 77-3433

17 JUN 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Administration

FROM: Robert W. Gambino
Director of Security

15 jfb
20 JUN 1977

SUBJECT: Security Reinvestigation Program (U)

1. (U) Action Requested: None; for information only.

2. (U/AIUO) Background: Reference is made to your memorandum of 1 June 1977 which relates to the Office of Security Reinvestigation Program of 1976, when we processed 762 reinvestigations and developed noteworthy information in 72 cases. A question was raised as to what action was ultimately taken in these 72 reinvestigation cases.

3. (C) A review of our security files on these Agency officers discloses that in 21 cases the employee was personally interviewed, counseled, or warned concerning the information which had been developed in the course of our security processing. Following these personal interviews by a Personnel Security Officer, the matter was considered to have been satisfactorily resolved in favor of the employee, and no further action was considered necessary.

4. (C) In 27 cases the information developed during the field investigation was followed by polygraph testing. Of this total, there were 15 instances when the entire package was appropriately appraised by our Clearance Division and the decision was made that no further action would be required. In the other 12 cases, it was considered advisable to meet with these employees and reaffirm Agency security policies or to counsel them in an appropriate manner. At that point the cases were considered closed.

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REFERENCE

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77-7777

1 JUN 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Security Review of the Moore Case

I read on page 44 of the Security Review of the Moore Case that in 1966 there were 762 reinvestigations which developed 72 cases. The Study further breaks these 72 down into 15 categories. Would you let me know what action was ultimately taken in these 72 cases.

[Redacted Signature]

STANSFIELD TURNER

STATINTL

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UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Routing Slip

Security

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	D/DCI/IC				
4	DDS&T				
5	DDI				
6	DDA		X		
7	DDO				
8	D/DCI/NI				
9	GC				
10	LC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/Pers				
14	D/S	X			
15	DTR				
16	A/DCI/PA				
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/IPS				
19	DCI/SS				
20			X		
21	ES		X		
22					

SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks:

Please forward response via DDCI.

1 June 1977

Date

3637 (8-77)

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